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This paper deals with the impact of direct bupati (district head) elections on local politics with 
regard to land confl icts in the district of Paser, Indonesia. I discuss the position and infl uence 
of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in this process and their usage of adat-based land 
claims. The paper is concerned with the internal political context of government-NGO power 
relations as well as with the position and proﬁ ling of these parties in Paserese society at large. 
The subject is approached through a discussion of two ‘land’ occupations (one in fact being a sea 
occupation) by groups claiming adat rights, and of the measures taken by the local government 
and NGOs alike. The new importance of regional politics and local responsibility of those in power 
in Paser are reviewed against the background of Indonesian political reform. I argue that results 
are likely to be determined by a speciﬁ c local context and momentum rather than by nationwide 
developments.
Keywords: adat-based claims, confl icts, politics, governance, Indonesia
In diesem Artikel untersuche ich die Auswirkungen der Direktwahlen des bupati 
(Distriktsvorstehers) auf die politische Lage innerhalb des Bezirks Paser, Indonesien. Dabei dis-
kutiere ich die Einfl ussnahme diverser Nichtregierungsorganisationen (NGOs) auf den Wahlprozess 
und auf die Lösung lokaler Landkonfl ikte. Die NGOs unterstützen adat-basierte Forderungen der 
Bevölkerung auf gesicherte Landbesitzverhältnisse. Sowohl der interne politische Kontext als 
auch die Position und Selbstdarstellung der Regierungs- und Nichtregierungsakteure innerhalb 
der Gesellschaft Pasers werden untersucht und anhand der Diskussion zweier Landbesetzungen 
(eine dieser Besetzungen ist faktisch eine ‘Meeresbesetzung’) veranschaulicht. Regionalismus und 
die Haftbarkeit lokaler Regierungsakteure werden im Zuge der derzeitigen politischen Reformen 
Indonesiens zunehmend wichtiger. Ich argumentiere, dass lokale politische Ereignisse in erster 
Linie durch lokale Kontexte bzw. Eigendynamiken und nicht etwa durch landesweite politische 
Trends verursacht werden.
Schlagworte: adat-gestützte Forderungen, Konfl ikte, Politik, Governance, Indonesien
1  Laurens Bakker is currently based at Leiden University’s Van Vollenhoven Institute. He teaches Anthropology of 
Law at the Radboud University in Nijmegen, as well as Anthropology and Sociology of Development at the University 
of Amsterdam; research interests (among others): material culture, tourism, law and religion. Laurens Bakker has 
carried out fieldwork in Indonesia (Kalimantan, Mentawai, Nias) and in the Netherlands. Contact: l.bakker@jur.
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Introduction2
In 2004 Ridwan Suwidi was elected bupati (district head) of Paser, the southernmost 
district of East Kalimantan. During his campaign Suwidi promised that, if elected, he 
would do his utmost to alleviate the daily problems of the poor. Suwidi was elected 
and the people looked at him expectantly. Suwidi came up with solutions – among 
others he implemented programs to provide free healthcare and education in the 
district. In this paper I discuss changes in Paserese land policy; a field in which much 
conflict and discontent exist which essentially revolve around insecurity of tenure. 
Poor land users often are unable to pay for the procedure of registering their land, 
and the reputation for corruption of the National Land Agency (Badan Pertanahan 
Nasional) makes registration even less attractive. Under Indonesia’s so-called ‘New 
Order’ regime (1966-98), unregistered land in Paser was frequently given in concession 
to oil palm plantations notwithstanding contesting claims from the population. 
After the fall of president Suharto in 1998, such popular land claims returned with a 
vengeance. In Paser, Suwidi had to balance such local interests with national ones in 
finding a solution. He did, and the result was unusual.
In this paper I focus on the effects of such new power relations in the field of land 
tenure.3 By comparing the policies of two consecutive bupati and looking at the in-
fluence of Paser’s two most powerful adat4 non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 
I want to show that the importance of local politics in Paser has certainly increased, 
but not necessarily in the transparent and responsible rule of law fashion that refor-
mers aspired to.
Changed times and leaders
Following massive calls for more democracy and an end to authoritarian New Order 
government and its corruption, Suharto resigned as president of Indonesia in 1998. 
2  This paper is based on fieldwork carried out in the district of Paser, called Pasir until 2007, by the author between 
2004 and 2007 as part of his Ph.D. research.
3  The districts (kabupaten) and municipalities (kotamadya) together make up the regional (daerah) level of government. 
Several regions form a province governed by a provincial government, and all provinces together are controlled by 
the central authorities of the national government.
4  The term adat is usually translated as ‘custom’ or ‘tradition’.
31
ASEAS 2 (1)
The nation’s future was uncertain. Riots had taken place in many large cities while 
violent clashes between ethnic or religious groups occurred in various areas. As civil 
war and possible disintegration of the state seemed by no means unlikely, Suharto’s 
successor B. J. Habibie introduced Law 22 of 1999 on regional government and Law 
25 of 1999 on fiscal relations bet-
ween the central and the lower re-
gional levels of government as the 
government’s political countermo-
ve.5 Named ‘regional autonomy’ 
(otonomi daerah) the laws empha-
sized the national government’s in-
tention to increase administrative 
authorities at the district level of 
government. With decision-taking 
power in local affairs in the hands 
of the regional government rather 
than in those of unknown burea-
ucrats in remote Jakarta, the regi-
ons became relatively autonomous 
units in which local political par-
ticipation greatly increased.6 With 
hundreds of regions throughout the 
nation, regional government gained 
a multitude of shapes and varieties.
Although optimistic perceptions 
of Indonesia’s future existed, so did 
negative ones. The laws contained vague formulations, and few control mechanisms 
were included. Law 22 of 1999, for instance, explicitly stated which fields remained 
under the central government’s authority, but was vague in defining the exact po-
5  Essentially, these laws decentralised greater administrative autonomy to the regional level of government, and 
introduced a new fiscal scheme providing the regions with more control over local finances 
6  ‘Region’ refers to daerah, the third level of government after the national and provincial governments. Regions can 
be either districts (kabupaten) in the case of largely rural areas, or municipalities (kotamadya) if the region’s main 
feature is a sizeable city. 
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Records congratulating Ridwan Suwidi 
on his election as the oldest Indonesian 
district head ever (Photo by L. Bakker)
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wers of the districts.7 
Scholars and Indonesia observers feared that local elites would capture regional 
government and resources (Schulte Nordholt, 2003), resulting in a decrease of central 
government control and possibly in outright violence (Forrester, 1999). Corruption 
and collusion within regional government would take rampant forms as they would 
lose the New Order’s centralized control and numerous ‘little Suhartos’ would start 
pillaging the region under their control (Kimura, 1999, p. 37). Publications dealing 
with the impact of decentralization showed a considerable variation in regional ex-
periences (for instance Schulte Nordholt & Van Klinken, 2007) with the common cha-
racteristic of the emergence of regional struggles for control over regional govern-
ment, natural resources and social power. Parties in these conflicts are often headed 
by a region’s established economic, ethnic, religious or political elites, making clear 
that these power struggles indeed often are local affairs. 
Yet the prominence of the established elite was increasingly being questioned. 
Throughout the nation a grassroots counterweight took shape, as NGOs aimed at 
monitoring government actions or representing specific interest groups came into 
existence. The New Order government had kept a particularly tight reign on NGO 
activities (see Eldridge, 1994; Cleary, 1997, p. 14-58), yet rudimentary advocacy or-
ganizations had developed in defending the interests of, among others, peasants, 
labourers, indigenous peoples and the environment against those of ‘the state’ (cf. 
Ganie-Rochman, 2002). Following regional autonomy new NGOs, for instance various 
anti-corruption NGOs (see Rasyid, 2003, p. 70), took highly critical stances towards 
the government and the functioning of its officials. Others, such as the national 
indigenous peoples’ organization Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara (AMAN), advo-
cated state recognition of indigenous rights to land and natural resources.8 NGOs 
with highly diverse foci came into being throughout the regions. Their power and 
influence differed considerably, but it is clear that NGO influence has increased after 
decentralization.
In 2004, revised versions of the 1999 decentralization laws came into force. These 
7  The central government’s authorities include, among others, international politics, defence, justice, monetary and 
fiscal policy, and religion (cf. Jaya, 2003).
8   At its first congress in 1999, AMAN’s chairman publicly announced that AMAN would not recognize the Indonesian 
state if the government would not officially recognize AMAN’s members as indigenous peoples (see Li, 2003). His 
message was clear: Indonesia should recognize its indigenous peoples and their traditional claims.
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revisions strengthened the control of provincial governments over the regions and 
further specified the authorities of the central government. Although critics feared 
the laws would cause ‘recentralization’ and ‘the end of regional autonomy’ (e.g. Su-
giarto, 2003), Law 32 of 2004 (which revised Law 22 of 1999) stipulated that the re-
gional head would henceforth be elected directly by the population of the region, 
thus making a bupati directly accountable to the population of the district. Whereas 
regional affiliation and backing already were important factors for aspiring regional 
heads (see, for instance, Benda-Beckmann & Benda-Beckmann, 2001), these direct 
elections officialised the ‘localization’ of regional heads. Localization provided space 
for the prioritization of regional identity and a foundation to claims of indigeneity-
derived rights (cf. Duncan, 2007, pp. 726-727), and was the driving force behind new 
regions splitting off from existing ones (see Fitrani, Hofman, & Kaiser, 2005). Cam-
paigning candidates for the bupati position had to take these issues into account and 
paid homage to such adat, ethnic and religious sentiments that existed in the region. 
Bupati campaigns emphasized earlier personal successes and rivals’ shortcomings, 
and ensured votes through favours, gifts and promises.9 Almost by default, candi-
dates would have to deal with insinuations of corruption which – whether true or 
false – have been added to parties’ political arsenals (cf. Schulte Nordholt, 2005). No 
candidate would emerge fully ‘clean’ from the campaigning period. The same goes 
for NGOs. As local NGOs can play a prominent role in the election process through 
support or opposition, it is not uncommon for NGOs and bupati candidates to form 
alliances. Yet whereas such alliances may provide NGOs with influence in local go-
vernment, it makes them vulnerable to – possibly political – allegations of corruption 
as well (see Hadiwinata, 2003, pp. 113-119; Eldridge, 2005).
Paser’s adat NGOs
With a territory of 11,600 square kilometres and almost 173,000 inhabitants, Paser is 
sparsely populated. Geographically it consists of an extensive coastal plain bisected 
by several rivers and a mountainous hinterland. Oil palm plantations as well as coal 
9  See for discussions of regional elections for instance Vel (2005) on Sumba, Choi (2004; 2007) on Yogyakarta and on 
Riau, Buehler (2007) on South Sulawesi, and Brown & Diprose (2007) on Central Sulawesi.
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mining make up the major economic activities. Paser is an immigration destination 
and houses a population from all over Indonesia. Those not working in the district’s 
plantations are mainly farmers or fishermen. Ethnically diverse, the district has si-
zeable populations of Javanese, Buginese, Banjarese and Paserese; the latter are con-
sidered to be the original inhabitants of the area and form about 25 percent of the 
population. Usually Paserese and migrants live together without problems. Inter-
marriage between the major groups is common as all are Muslim. In the mountains, 
where the Paserese are the dominant population group, Paserese culture strongly re-
sembles that of neighbouring Dayak groups.10 Even though the people feel themselves 
connected to the Paserese of the plains through language and culture, their history 
is relatively independent from political events in the coastal area.
From the 1960s onwards the national government encouraged the implementati-
on of economic and agricultural development programmes in Kalimantan. In Paser 
logging operations were followed by mining projects and oil palm plantations. Large 
numbers of migrants arrived to provide labour for these enterprises. Especially in 
the coastal areas government officials gave out concessions to land which was being 
claimed by Paserese as theirs by adat right.11 Popular protests against these conces-
sions proved ineffective, while official law, in the shape of Paser’s district court, 
refused to accommodate claimants arguing adat rights. Accepted proof in land cases 
usually takes the shape of a land certificate, receipts of land tax payments, written 
statements by village heads or other documents pertaining to national law or govern-
ment, none of which function in adat.
Paserese adat NGOs attempted to gain influence within the district government. 
These were primarily bend on upholding adat claims to land by indigenous Paserese 
and on providing a counterweight to the denial of such rights by government autho-
rities. Paser’s two main NGOs, the LAP (Lembaga Adat Paser / Paser Adat Foundation) 
and the PBA-PDB (Pertahanan Benuo Adat–Paser Dayak Serumpun / Defence of our Adat–
Dayak Paser Branch; hereafter PBA), were both founded in 2000. They were fierce 
rivals, publicly disputing each other’s sincerity, honesty and knowledge of adat, but 
not engaging in open conflict. The LAP, whose cadre and members mainly consisted 
10  ‘Dayak’ generally refers to the non-Muslim, non-Malay original inhabitants of Borneo, who generally live in the 
interior of the island.
11  The question of recognition of adat-based land claims continues to divide Indonesian legal experts as well as the 
population. National land legislation is not clear on the issue. 
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of civil servants, swiftly succeeded in gaining influence within the district govern-
ment which, in searching for a way to deal with Paser’s various NGOs, made the LAP 
its official NGO discussion partner.12 In this function all NGOs wanting to address the 
government had to do so through the LAP, which thus shielded the government from 
direct NGO interference.13 On the one hand this position earned the LAP a reputation 
of being a ‘governmental non-governmental organization’, on the other hand suppor-
ters felt that the LAP had gained a highly effective position. Either way an important 
consequence was that the LAP became unable to speak out in direct opposition to 
the government. As a critical member of another Paserese NGO put it to me in an 
interview: “the biggest watchdog has had its political teeth pulled”.
The PBA followed a different strategy through emphasizing the link between Pa-
serese and Dayak, thus associating themselves with the reputation for wildness and 
fierceness that Dayak have among non-Dayak.14 The PBA believed the district govern-
ment to be incapable of understanding Paserese adat or assessing the quality of adat-
based land claims, as nearly all officials originated from other parts of Indonesia. 
Therefore they specialized in assisting Paserese involved in adat-based land conflicts. 
The PBA did not provide assistance in court or at the local land registration office; 
their assistance consisted of deciding the case according to what they claimed to be 
Paserese adat in a meeting with both parties. Especially if the defendant party was 
non-Paserese and non-complying they would return for another visit, if necessary in 
force. PBA members have a threatening appearance; grim-looking, uniformed young 
men arrive to support their leaders’ decisions en masse, bringing thoughts of Dayak 
violence to mind as a former opponent remarked. In many cases their opponents 
gave in or negotiated a deal to avoid further problems. Operating at the margins of 
legality, the success of PBA actions gained them the trust and support of numerous 
Paserese and a profile as the organization to contact when one needed support in a 
case not involving the government, whereas the LAP would be approached for mat-
12  See Paser district regulation number 3 of 2000 on the Empowerment, Preservation, Protection and Development 
of Adat and Adat Organizations. (Peraturan Daerah 3 Tahun 2000 Tentang Pemberdayaan, Pelestarian, Perlindungan dan 
Pengembangan Adat Istiadat dan Lembaga Adat).
13  The ‘non-government’ quality of an NGO largely consisting of bureaucrats can be questioned, as Paserese critics 
have done in the case of the LAP. They argue that the organization was established to generate government influence 
and support in the non-government movement. Although this might be an underlying reason for the LAP’s benevolent 
relation with the government, it does not do the LAP justice. Realizing their need for public credibility the LAP has 
increasingly developed a policy of critically distinguishing itself from the government. 
14  A reputation that was notably strengthened by the ethnic fighting between Dayak and Malay against Madurese 
that took place in West and Cental Kalimantan between 1998 and 2002.
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ters involving district authorities. The LAP’s official position as partner to the district 
government and the rivalry between the two groups meant that the PBA had no 
access to the government. The LAP, on the other hand, could not afford to engage in 
the radical actions that earned the PBA its reputation of boldness and effectiveness. 
Neither organization could surpass the other in influence, resulting in intense 
rivalry over the status of foremost representative of Paser’s adat population. 2005 
proved to be a good year for both, as I will discuss next. 
Plantations and elections
From 2001 onwards, a serious land conflict had the hitherto quiet backwater of Paser 
in the national newspaper headlines. For more than a year the population of ten Pa-
serese villages and PTPN Sawit Indonesia15, a national oil palm plantation company, 
had been at odds over the rights to part of one of the latter’s plantations. The villa-
gers claimed that the area was their adat land and threatened to occupy the land if no 
return or indemnification was undertaken. They had no formal proof of land owner-
ship, but they were many. Local estimates came at 4,000 villagers and sympathizers. 
Paser’s bupati of the time, Yusriansyah Syarkawi, was reluctant to act against the 
villagers. East Kalimantan had been peaceful for decades and local police intelligence 
estimated that such actions would spark unrest and possibly violence.
Tension over land ownership had been building for decades. The Paserese felt in-
dignant over the near casualness with which migrants and outside companies were 
awarded rights to ‘their’ adat land by the district authorities. Should fights break 
out, the police feared, there was no telling whether Paserese would not use the oc-
casion to drive out migrant communities or receive help from Dayak in neighbouring 
districts. Although the police commander had agreed to do nothing for the moment, 
district headquarters had two companies of mobile brigade (BRIMOB), the militarized 
police force usually dealing with mass demonstrations, standing by. Yet the Paserese 
occupiers were not interested in a fight, but in land and income. They maintained 
that the oil palm company only had permits to operate on the land of two villages, 
15  Not this company’s actual name.
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and had steadily extended its activities illegally onto the land of the other eight (“Gu-
gatan Baru”, 2001). They proposed to the district government to allow them to ope-
rate the illegal plantation land under a Plasma scheme.16 Such a scheme would help 
the villagers secure formal rights to the land which would remain state land if the 
rights remained with the company. Paser’s government was willing to agree to the 
proposal, as was the local PTPN Sawit Indonesia management but, as the company 
was a state-owned one, it needed the consent of its superiors in Jakarta. 
The national plantation department, from its side, was slow to reply. On May 17, 
2001 the villagers denied PTPN Indonesia Sawit’s workers entry to a plot of 2,400 
hectares and kept up a steady blockade. It became impossible to harvest fruits while 
the houses of the (mostly migrant) workers living on the terrain were sealed by the 
villagers, forcing the inhabitants to find shelter elsewhere. In early June a company 
representative from Jakarta attended a meeting organized by the chief of police, but 
found the meeting ignored by all but a few representatives. The majority wanted 
the meeting to be chaired by the bupati or the provincial governor, who both had 
declined, rather than by a police official who, they feared, would bully and threaten 
them into giving in. Nonetheless the plantation company’s representative declared 
that his superiors were willing to agree to the Plasma scheme but had to await an 
official decision from higher up, which, the representative thought, was short in the 
coming (“Tak Terkabul”, 2001). Two months later the conflict appeared in the natio-
nal media (“Konflik Pertanahan”, 2001) for the last time. By then the plantation was 
suffering from severe neglect and the migrant workers had moved away, while no 
news had come from Jakarta. The article in the national newspaper “Kompas” (“Kon-
flik Pertanahan”, 2001) gave ample attention to Syarkawi’s comments of how the 
problem had been haunting him almost since his appointment as bupati and he really 
wanted to see it settled. Indecisiveness or indifference in Jakarta, where he had gone 
to discuss the issue with central government officials, as well as stubbornness by the 
local population had killed the plantation off, Syarkawi felt.
The next three years saw little change of the situation. No solution was forthco-
ming from the company’s headquarters in Jakarta, and the contested area became 
overgrown. Villagers would not invest time and effort into maintaining the oil palms 
16  ‘Plasma’ are small village enterprises often supported and financed by a large company that buys the end products. 
As the company in question owned all oil palm processing plants in the area the villagers had little choice but to opt 
for cooperation, but their choice to make the first proposal gave them the initiative. 
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if accommodation of their demands was uncertain. It became clear that Syarkawi’s 
passive stance had not endeared him to the Paserese population and could work 
against him in the 2005 bupati elections. He had no NGO support. The PBA had come 
to prominence advising and supporting the villagers in the above case, while the LAP, 
after initially supporting Syarkawi’s stance, had begun to distance itself from him. 
Moreover, Ishak Usman, the head of the LAP, made it clear that he would enter the 
district head elections as running mate for another candidate emphasizing the posi-
tion of poor farmers in general and of the indigenous Paserese in particular. Syarkawi 
and Usman went reasonably well in the polls, but were steadily outmatched by the 
more charismatic Ridwan Suwidi.
Suwidi was an outside candidate with a claim to local identity. Born to immi-
grant parents but raised in Paser, he appealed to both immigrants and Paserese. 
He was a devout Muslim, which is of importance in highly religious Southeast Ka-
limantan. Although in his eighties, he was an athletic and energetic man who had 
gained extensive political ex-
perience as a former member 
of East Kalimantan’s provincial 
parliament and, quite impor-
tant, was not associated in 
any way with the failure of Pa-
serese authorities to settle the 
district’s land disputes. Suwidi 
promised that if elected, he 
would focus on improving the 
lives of Paser’s masses rather 
than concentrating on compa-
ny interests. His fame spread 
when he announced that those 
with problems which the district government could relieve should come to his office 
during the day or visit him at home in the evening. Shortly before the election date, 
when interim polls and low-profile discussions had provided some indications of like-
ly outcomes, the PBA came out in support of Suwidi.
Suwidi won the elections, the people came to his office and it became clear that 
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bupati and vice-bupati (Photo by L. Bakker)
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adat-based land claims were prominent among the problems stated. Aware of the 
issue’s sensitivity, Suwidi recognized the practical problem of involving the district 
court. Although his candidacy had been endorsed by the PBA – who henceforth would 
receive government funding – and the LAP had been reaffirmed in its official position, 
Suwidi was unwilling to closely align his reputation and position to the adat NGOs. 
Instead he decided upon an alternative course of action; land conflicts were to be 
mediated by laymen who focussed on the welfare of Paser’s society as a whole. The 
public administration division (tatapraja) of the bupati’s staff were given this task.
The responsibilities of the public administration division can be broadly described 
as studying, developing, implementing and reviewing district government policies, 
and advising the district government when this is deemed necessary. On the whole, 
the division works relatively independent and is expected to use a reflexive and holi-
stic approach. Tatapraja staff and their colleagues in the legal division were respon-
sible for understanding and implementing the responsibilities and authorities of the 
regions as set out in the 1999 and 2004 decentralization laws. For the larger part of 
Syarkawi’s term as bupati (2001-2005) tatapraja personnel was engaged in studying 
these laws and advising on their implementation, leaving little time to consider the 
actual effects of the policies. Although the staff were aware of the PTPN Sawit In-
donesia plantation dispute, they had not been involved at any stage. 
When Suwidi came into office in 2005 he found Paser’s oil palm sector in poor sha-
pe and deteriorating. Although Syarkawi had managed to prevent escalation of the 
PTPN Sawit Indonesia conflict, his government had not been able to solve the pro-
blem. The blockade had paralyzed a considerable percentage of the plantation while 
its unopposed continuation made oil palm companies hesitate to make new invest-
ments in Paser. As many trees in the older plantations no longer bore fruit, Paser’s 
plantations were in need of replanting with young palms in order to guarantee a 
continuation of the district’s main agrarian product. PTPN Sawit Indonesia did not 
consider replanting while new investors proved hard to find.17 Suwidi applied for as-
sistance to the central government in Jakarta and managed to convince the national 
plantation department to act as guarantor for a bank loan to Paser. The money was 
to be used to revitalize old plantations. The money would be made available as loans 
17   Government sources which I prefer to keep anonymous told me that at that time the company’s board considered 
evacuating Paser in favour of other districts with a less hostile population and a more energetic government.
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to the local population to replant 20,000 hectares of oil palm, including the 2,400 hec-
tares claimed in the PTPN Sawit Indonesia case, and 10,000 hectares of rubber trees 
under a population plantation (kebun rakyat) scheme intended to prevent further 
conflict and stimulate stability in the district.18 The tatapraja division was found to be 
an ideal vehicle both for monitoring the implementation of these and other, private, 
new plantation projects. Three officials on its staff, an ethnic Paserese and two mi-
grants, were specifically tasked with preventing new conflicts and solving those still 
in existence. A demanding and sensitive task, as the following example illustrates.
Fishing for coal boats
The Adang bay is Paser’s largest coastal inlet. With a length of around fifteen kilome-
tres, it has a maximum width of almost ten kilometres and penetrates deeply inland. 
The water along the bay’s banks is shallow and runs out into extensive mangroves 
and marshlands, a breeding ground for fish and shrimps. Many of the mainly Paserese 
inhabitants of the main villages along the bay, Paser Mayang and Air Mati, make a 
living as fishermen. Yet Adang bay also functions as the loading point for coal barges. 
The barges – big, square, open lighters – cannot come close to the shore and remain 
18  The first two years of Ridwan Suwidi’s term are discussed at length at sadurangas.net, a discussion forum on 
Paser.
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in the deeper water of the bay’s centre. Smaller boats ferry the coal to the barges 
twenty-four hours per day. 
In October 2005 fishing boats occupied the bay and prevented coal barges ente-
ring or departing. The fishermen claimed that the continuous activity in the bay was 
disturbing fish breeding and hence diminishing the fish stock, making PT Batubara19, 
an international mining company and the major coalmine operator in the area, re-
sponsible for their loss of revenue. Whereas Paserese villagers claimed adat rights to 
land in the PTPN Sawit Indonesia case, Paserese fishermen claimed adat rights to the 
Adang bay’s fishing grounds. A delegation went to speak with PT Batubara’s manage-
ment but did not receive any commitments. The management was not convinced 
that their ships were responsible for diminished catches and was unwilling to take 
responsibility.
The fishermen decided to bring their claim before the district court.20 At the first 
summoning the mining company failed to appear. At the second summoning, a week 
later, a representative of the company attended to inform the court that PT Batubara 
maintained that there was no ground for the fishermen’s complaint as the compa-
ny possessed all the required permits and had no obligations towards the villages. 
In case the fishermen would wish to continue with their claim, the representative 
added, they should contact the company’s main office in Jakarta. The management 
based in Paser was not entitled to decide such matters independently. Upon recei-
ving this information the district court judge ruled that his court was incompetent 
to decide the case. As PT Batubara formally resided in Jakarta, the case had to be 
brought before the relevant municipal court there. 
The next day the coal barges found their way blocked by numerous fishing boats 
from the two villages. In the run-up to the court appearance two enterprising vil-
lagers had requested assistance of the PBA in founding a representing organization. 
These two men now visited the bupati’s office to explain their action and request 
assistance. The fishermen feared that PT Batubara’s management would ignore their 
demands now that the district court had referred them to Jakarta. As simple village 
fishermen they neither had the means, the confidence nor the knowledge to travel 
to Jakarta and accost the capital’s bureaucracy. Unwilling to renege on their demand 
19  Not this company’s actual name.
20  See “Warga Berteriak” (2005) for a presentation of the claims.
42
ASEAS 2 (1) Laurens Bakker - Policies and Polls: Elections and Land Conflicts in Paser, Indonesia
the fishermen had decided to try and force the miners to cooperate. The tatapraja 
mediation team was charged to assist in the matter. 
The blockade remained in place for two days but was eventually ended when the 
police arrested an individual from each of the two villages and instructed them to 
tell the fishermen to end the blockade as otherwise outside police would be called in 
since the mining company had lodged an official complaint. The blockade was duly 
lifted.
Ahmed21 of tatapraja, an ethnic Paserese, was instructed to initiate a dialogue bet-
ween the parties. This proved a tough task. PT Batubara’s management emphasized 
their lack of authority and kept referring both the fishermen and Ahmed to its Jakar-
ta headquarters, while the fishermen’s organization presented calculations showing 
that each family suffered a yearly loss of 1,500,000 to 2,500,000 Indonesian Rupiah 
(approximately 120 to 200 Euro). When no progress was made after several months of 
meetings, discussions and negotiations, the fishermen, with PBA advise, concluded 
that the mining company was stalling. Without informing Ahmed, they reacted by 
targeting the barges’ loaders. Fishing nets were cast along the loaders’ route from 
the docks to the barges, creating a maze for the boats to navigate. When the nets 
got caught in the loaders’ screws, the waiting fishermen would demand a compen-
sation of several times the actual value of the net. The captains of the coal loaders 
paid up to avoid trouble with the fishermen parties, but got into problems when PT 
Batubara’s management made it clear that they would not submit to blackmail and 
refused to refund their captains. 
In May 2006, Suwidi became personally involved. Vexed that the conflict remained 
unsolved he organized a meeting with PT Batubara’s national board, which sent a 
delegation from Jakarta. Suwidi publicly put on pressure by presenting the delega-
tion with copies of a concept district regulation instructing companies operating in 
Paser to include a specific percentage of locals in their workforce and stated publicly 
that he hoped that PT Batubara and the district population would have a long and 
fruitful future of cooperation (see “Bupati Sosialisasikan,” 2006). A few days later, 
however, some 1,000 locals held a protest march against PT Batubara, protesting its 
limited interests in the welfare of the population and demanding it to close down its 
21  Not this individual’s actual name.
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operations.22 Although PT Batubara’s local management was swift to point out that 
the company had donated billions of Rupiah to community projects since it began 
operating in Paser, the spokesperson for the protesters maintained that the company 
should focus on relevant issues, such as the percentage of Paserese in its workforce 
(“Seribu Warga”, 2006). The mining company agreed to prioritize Paserese candidates 
for its workforce, possibly urged on by an additional new idea voiced by Suwidi to 
request a yearly voluntary contribution to the district treasury from each company 
working in Paser (“Kontraktor Perioritaskan”, 2006). Relations with the district go-
vernment had become strained by PT Batubara’s unwillingness to help Ahmed and his 
colleagues solve the conflict, yet Suwidi’s suggestions and the protest moved things 
along. PT Batubara stepped up its support programs to include road construction, 
school building and various other mainly non-financial contributions in the wide area 
of the Adang bay. 
Politics behind the scenes
The PTPN Sawit Indonesia and PT Batubara cases appear to have been managed in 
relative unison by the district government and NGOs, with a leading role for Suwidi. 
This is however a simplistic depiction of the situation as both the PBA and the LAP 
took the initiative, forcing the government to follow up or risk exclusion. 
When Suwidi defeated Usman in the 2005 elections his willingness to have the 
LAP maintain its favoured position put the LAP in a dependent position. The organi-
zation could not overtly critique Suwidi’s actions, yet was unwilling to give up the 
prominence and independence it had developed during Syarkawi’s last year in office 
and the election campaign. Ostensibly consenting, it invested in enlisting Paserese 
government officials in order to further its influence through them. One of those 
rising through the LAP’s ranks was Ahmed, one of the tatapraja mediators brought 
in by Suwidi in an attempt to establish a non-NGO and non-juridical negotiation ve-
hicle. Ahmed frequently referred to Paserese adat and land rights and would bring in 
Usman, the LAP leader, as paramount expert. Ahmed frequently organized meetings 
22  Various informants mentioned the PBA as one of the organizers of the protest.
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between parties at Usman’s house, thus giving the LAP access to negotiations where 
Suwidi preferred their absence. Initially a low rank member, Ahmed gained prestige 
and influence within the LAP until his superiors in the administration found out and 
‘promoted’ him to another department. Likewise, the PBA had been disappointed 
that the LAP was not demoted from its formal position and felt that whereas it had 
given up its autonomy, the government influence it received in return was weaker 
than the LAP’s. The PBA chose to cling to its well-known role as supporters of the 
Paserese common people rather than embark upon an uncertain course of diplomacy 
with the district government and engaged in demonstrations rather than assisting 
in settling these disputes. These factors led to a situation in which Suwidi’s new and 
‘objective’ negotiators were ‘kidnapped’ by the LAP and frustrated by ‘friendly’ PBA 
advisors. Ostensibly government partners, the two NGOs chose to continue their 
vendetta and continue to follow their own agendas from within their government 
alliances. 
Concluding remarks
The regional level of governance has certainly come to the fore in the wake of de-
centralization. Whereas the fear of ‘little Suhartos’ or a well-entrenched local elite 
taking control on this level seems justified by examples from other areas, the exa-
mple of Paser illustrates the possibilities of change that political reform could offer. 
Suwidi’s election victory was furthered by his identity as a relative outsider who was 
not part of the established elite, contrary to Usman who – despite his best efforts 
in the LAP – was an established career bureaucrat and popularly perceived as part of 
the local elite. Promise is debt and Suwidi was aware of that. His lack of established 
interests in the district allowed him to act accordingly and introduce considerable re-
forms in government-population relations. Nonetheless, the PBA and LAP maintained 
an undercurrent of competition with the government. From a strategic perspective 
they had to: How can a non-governmental organization claiming to represent the 
interests of local adat profile itself apart from in defending this adat? Almost by de-
fault, the opponent would, especially in matters of land, be the local government. 
Suwidi’s policy of incorporating the NGOs and establishing his own team of negoti-
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ators furthermore largely stole their thunder, giving rise to counter-coups along the 
same lines.
For both government and NGOs, the policies referred to in the title mean the ob-
tainment and maintenance of as much social relevance vis-à-vis the other as possible, 
while at the same time presenting, if not claiming, rival successes as own results. 
The polls are the measure for success. Confirming election results, polls set the con-
ditions – election promises – by which the bupati’s performance will be judged. Af-
terwards, however, the success and popularity of the bupati and the respective NGOs 
vis-à-vis one another can be seen as a permanent indicator of the social preferences 
in the district. Direct elections have introduced a permanent unofficial polling of the 
performances of the bupati, the district government in general, and local NGOs. All 
require social support, and society is critical in its appreciation.
Land conflict, the social arena I chose to focus on in this article, illustrates these 
conditions quite effectively. As a material, immovable commodity, land is a prize to 
be fought over that cannot be embezzled or palmed in an inattentive moment. Re-
sults will be out in the open and so, by default, will be the underlying decisions and 
stances of the various parties.
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